Tuesday, January 28, 2014

Morpho-Syntactic Analysis


While traditional hand-built grammars often include
a rich semantics, we have found their
coverage inadequate for the logic puzzles task.
For example, the English Resource Grammar
(Copestake and Flickinger, 2000) fails to parse
any of the sentences in Figure 1 for lack of coverage
of some words and of several different syntactic
structures; and parsable simplified versions
of the text produce dozens of unranked
parse trees. For this reason, we use a broadcoverage
statistical parser (Klein and Manning,
2003) trained on the Penn Treebank. In addition
to robustness, treebank-trained statistical
parsers have the benefit of extensive research
on accurate ambiguity resolution. Qualitatively,
we have found that the output of the parser on
logic puzzles is quite good (see §10). After parsing,
each word in the resulting parse trees is
converted to base form by a stemmer.
A few tree-transformation rules are applied
on the parse trees to make them more convenient
for combinatorial semantics. Most of them
are general, e.g. imposing a binary branching
structure on verb phrases, and grouping expressions
like “more than”. A few of them correct
some parsing errors, such as nouns marked as
names and vice-versa. There is growing awareness
in the probabilistic parsing literature that
mismatches between training and test set genre
can degrade parse accuracy, and that small
amounts of correct-genre data can be more important
than large amounts of wrong-genre data
(Gildea, 2001); we have found corroborating evidence
in misparsings of noun phrases common
in puzzle texts, such as “Sculptures C and E”,
which do not appear in the Wall Street Journal
corpus. Depending on the severity of this problem,
we may hand-annotate a small amount of
puzzle texts to include in parser training data.

Challenges

Combinatorial Semantics
The challenge of combinatorial semantics is to
be able to assign exactly one semantic representation
to each word and sub-phrase regardless
of its surrounding context, and to combine
these representations in a systematic way until
the representation for the entire sentence is obtained.
There are many linguistic constructions
in the puzzles whose compositional analysis is
difficult, such as a large variety of noun-phrase
structures (e.g., “Every sculpture must be exhibited
in a different room”) and ellipses (e.g.,
“Brian saw a taller man than Carl [did]”).
Scope Ambiguities
A sentence has a scope ambiguity when quantifiers
and other operators in the sentence can
have more than one relative scope. E.g., in constraint
(4) of Figure 1, “each room” outscopes
“at least one sculpture”, but in other contexts,
the reverse scoping is possible. The challenge
is to find, out of all the possible scopings, the
appropriate one, to understand the text as the
writer intended.
Reference Resolution
The puzzle texts contain a wide variety of
anaphoric expressions, including pronouns, definite
descriptions, and anaphoric adjectives. The
challenge is to identify the possible antecedents
that these expressions refer to, and to select
the correct ones. The problem is complicated
by the fact that anaphoric expressions interact
with quantifiers and may not refer to any particular
context element. E.g., the anaphoric expressions
in “Sculptures C and E are exhibited
in the same room” and in “Each man saw a different
woman” interact with sets ({C,E} and
the set of all men, respectively).
Plurality Disambiguation
Sentences that include plural entities are potentially
ambiguous between different readings:
distributive, collective, cumulative, and combinations
of these. For example, sentence 1 in
Figure 1 says (among other things) that each
of the six sculptures is displayed in one of the
three rooms – the group of sculptures and the
group of rooms behave differently here. Plurality
is a thorny topic which interacts in complex
ways with other semantic issues, including
quantification and reference.
Lexical Semantics
The meaning of open-category words is often
irrelevant to solving a puzzle. For example,
the meaning of “exhibited”, “sculpture”, and
“room” can be ignored because it is enough to
understand that the first is a binary relation
that holds between elements of groups described
by the second and third words.1 This observa-
tion provides the potential for a general system
that solves logic puzzles.
Of course, in many cases, the particular
meaning of open-category words and other expressions
is crucial to the solution. An example
is provided in question 2 of Figure 1: the system
has to understand what “a complete list”
means. Therefore, to finalize the meaning computed
for a sentence, such expressions should be
expanded to their explicit meaning. Although
there are many such cases and their analysis is
difficult, we anticipate that it will be possible to
develop a relatively compact library of critical
puzzle text expressions. We may also be able
to use existing resources such as WordNet and
FrameNet.
Information Gaps
Natural language texts invariably assume some
knowledge implicitly. E.g., Figure 1 does not explicitly
specify that a sculpture may not be exhibited
in more than one room at the same time.
Humans know this implicit information, but a
computer reasoning from texts must be given
it explicitly. Filling these information gaps is
a serious challenge; representation and acquisition
of the necessary background knowledge are
very hard AI problems. Fortunately, the puzzles
domain allows us to tackle this issue, as
explained in §8.
Presuppositions and Implicatures
In addition to its semantic meaning, a natural
language text conveys two other kinds of content.
Presuppositions are pieces of information assumed
in a sentence. Anaphoric expressions
bear presuppositions about the existence of entities
in the context; the answer choice “Sculptures
C and E” conveys the meaning {C,E},
but has the presupposition sculpture(C) ^
sculpture(E); and a question of the form A !
B, such as question 1 in Figure 1, presupposes
that A is consistent with the preamble.
Implicatures are pieces of information suggested
by the very fact of saying, or not saying,
something. Two maxims of (Grice, 1989)
dictate that each sentence should be both consistent
and informative (i.e. not entailed) with
respect to its predecessors. Another maxim dictates
saying as much as required, and hence the
sentence “No more than three sculptures may be
exhibited in any room” carries the implicature
that in some possible solution, three sculptures
are indeed exhibited in the same room.
Systematic calculation of presuppositions and
implicatures has been given less attention in
NLP and is less understood than the calculation
of meaning. Yet computing and verifying
them can provide valuable hints to the system
whether it understood the meaning of the text
correctly.

System Overview


This section explains the languages we use to
represent the content of a puzzle. Computing
the representations from a text is a complex process
with several stages, as shown in Figure 2.
Most of the stages are independent of the puzzles
domain. Section 3 reviews the main challenges
in this process, and later sections outline
the various processing stages. More details of
some of these stages can be found at (Stanford
NLP Group, 2004).
First-Order Logic (FOL)
An obvious way of solving logic puzzles is to
use off-the-shelf FOL reasoners, such as theorem
provers and model builders. Although most
GRE logic puzzles can also be cast as constraintsatisfaction
problems (CSPs), FOL representations
are more general and more broadly applicable
to other domains, and they are closer
to the natural language semantics. GRE logic
puzzles have finite small domains, so it is practicable
to use FOL reasoners.
The ultimate representation of the content of
a puzzle is therefore written in FOL. For example,
the representation for the first part of
constraint (4) in Figure 1 is: 8x.room(x) !
9y.sculpture(y)^exhibit(y, x). (The treatment
of the modal ‘must’ is explained in §9.2).
Semantic Logic (SL)
Representing the meaning of natural language
texts in FOL is not straightforward because
human languages employ events, plural entities,
modal operations, and complex numeric
expressions. We therefore use an intermediate
representation, written in Semantic Logic
(SL), which is intended to be a general-purpose
semantic representation language. SL extends
FOL with event and group variables, the modal
operators ¤ (necessarily) and § (possibly), and
Generalized Quantifiers (Barwise and Cooper,

1981) Q(type, var, restrictor, body), where type
can be 8, 9, at-least(n), etc. To continue the example,
the intermediate representation for the
constraint is:
¤Q(8, x1, room(x1),Q(¸1, x2, sculpture(x2),
9e.exhibit(e) ^ subj(e, x2) ^ in(e, x1)))
Non-determinism
Although logic puzzles are carefully designed
to reduce ambiguities to ensure that there
is exactly one correct answer per question,
there are still many ambiguities in the analysis,
such as multiple possibilities for syntactic
structures, pronominal reference, and quantifier
scope. Each module ranks possible output representations;
in the event that a later stage reveals
an earlier choice to be wrong (it may be
inconsistent with the rest of the puzzle, or lead
to a non-unique correct answer to a question),
the system backtracks and chooses the next-best
output representation for the earlier stage.

Why Logic Puzzles?


Logic puzzles have a number of attractive characteristics
as a target domain for research placing
a premium on precise inference.
First, whereas for humans the language understanding
part of logic puzzles is trivial but
the reasoning is difficult, for computers it is
clearly the reverse. It is straightforward for a
computer to solve a formalized puzzle, so the
research effort is on the NLP parts rather than
a difficult back-end AI problem. Moreover, only
a small core of world knowledge (prominently,
temporal and spatial entailments) is typically
crucial to solving the task.
Second, the texts employ everyday language:
there are no domain-restrictions on syntactic
and semantic constructions, and the situations
described by the texts are diverse.
Third, and most crucial, answers to puzzle
questions never explicitly appear in the text and

Preamble: Six sculptures – C, D, E, F, G, and H
– are to be exhibited in rooms 1, 2, and 3 of an art
gallery. The exhibition conforms to the following
conditions:
(1) Sculptures C and E may not be exhibited in
the same room.
(2) Sculptures D and G must be exhibited in the
same room.
(3) If sculptures E and F are exhibited in the same
room, no other sculpture may be exhibited in that
room.
(4) At least one sculpture must be exhibited in each
room, and no more than three sculptures may be
exhibited in any room.
Question 1: If sculpture D is exhibited in room
3 and sculptures E and F are exhibited in room 1,
which of the following may be true?
(A) Sculpture C is exhibited in room 1.
(B) No more than 2 sculptures are exhibited in
room 3.
(C) Sculptures F and H are exhibited in the same
room.
(D) Three sculptures are exhibited in room 2.
(E) Sculpture G is exhibited in room 2.
Question 2: If sculptures C and G are exhibited
in room 1, which of the following may NOT be a
complete list of the sculpture(s) exhibited in room
2?
(A) Sculpture D (B) Sculptures E and H (C). . .
must be logically inferred from it, so there is
very little opportunity to use existing superficial
analysis methods of information-extraction and
question-answering as a substitute for deep understanding.
A prerequisite for successful inference
is precise understanding of semantic phenomena
like modals and quantifiers, in contrast
with much current NLP work that just ignores
such items. We believe that representations
with a well-defined model-theoretic semantics
are required.
Finally, the task has a clear evaluation metric
because the puzzle texts are designed to yield
exactly one correct answer to each multiplechoice
question. Moreover, the domain is another
example of “found test material” in the
sense of (Hirschman et al., 1999): puzzle texts
were developed with a goal independent of the
evaluation of natural language processing systems,
and so provide a more realistic evaluation
framework than specially-designed tests such as
TREC QA.
While our current system is not a real world
application, we believe that the methods being
developed could be used in applications such as
a computerized office assistant that must understand
requests such as: “Put each file containing
a task description in a different directory.”

Solving Logic Puzzles:

Traditional approaches to natural language understanding
(Woods, 1973; Warren and Pereira,
1982; Alshawi, 1992) provided a good account
of mapping from surface forms to semantic representations,
when confined to a very limited
vocabulary, syntax, and world model, and resulting
low levels of syntactic/semantic ambiguity.
It is, however, difficult to scale these
methods to unrestricted, general-domain natural
language input because of the overwhelming
problems of grammar coverage, unknown words,
unresolvable ambiguities, and incomplete domain
knowledge. Recent work in NLP has
consequently focused on more robust, broadcoverage
techniques, but with the effect of
overall shallower levels of processing. Thus,
state-of-the-art work on probabilistic parsing
(e.g., (Collins, 1999)) provides a good solution
to robust, broad coverage parsing with automatic
and frequently successful ambiguity resolution,
but has largely ignored issues of semantic
interpretation. The field of Question Answering
(Pasca and Harabagiu, 2001; Moldovan et al.,
2003) focuses on simple-fact queries. And socalled
semantic parsing (Gildea and Jurafsky,
2002) provides as end output only a flat classification
of semantic arguments of predicates,
ignoring much of the semantic content, such as
quantifiers.
A major research question that remains unanswered
is whether there are methods for getting
from a robust “parse-anything” statistical
parser to a semantic representation precise
enough for knowledge representation and automated
reasoning, without falling afoul of the
same problems that stymied the broad application
of traditional approaches. This paper
presents initial work on a system that addresses
this question. The chosen task is solving logic
puzzles of the sort found in the Law School Admission
Test (LSAT) and the old analytic section
of the Graduate Record Exam (GRE) (see
Figure 1 for a typical example). The system integrates
statistical parsing, “on-the-fly” combinatorial
synthesis of semantic forms, scope- and
reference-resolution, and precise semantic representations
that support the inference required
for solving the puzzles. Our work complements
research in semantic parsing and TRECstyle
Question Answering by emphasizing complex
yet robust inference over general-domain
NL texts given relatively minimal lexical and
knowledge-base resources.

Monday, January 27, 2014

Limitations of Analytic Results


Any study of this nature is necessarily limited in several
respects. First of all, the survey approach used here is but one of
several that can be used to inform decisions about extending the
measurement of analytical abilities. Tucker’s (1985) results provide
useful information from different perspectives--those of cognitive
psychologists and philosophers. Other approaches that might also be
informative include the methods of cognitive psychology, which could
be used not only to supplement but also to extend the survey results
reported here. These methods would seem especially appropriate
because they relate more directly to actual skills and abilities than
to perceptions.
Second, the diversity that characterizes graduate education
renders the results of this study incomplete. Some clues have been
gained as to similarities and differences among a limited sample of
graduate fields. However, the substantial differences found among
fields are a source of concern, since we cannot be certain whether or
not some other sample of fields might exhibit even greater variation.
Finally, as several survey respondents pointed out, many of the
reasoning skills about which we asked are expected to, and do, improve
as the result of graduate study. In some sense these skills may
represent competencies that differ from, say, the verbal skills
measured by the GENEG eneral Test in the respect that these analytical
skills may develop much more rapidly. A question of interest, then,
is how to accommodate the measurement of these skills in the context
of graduate admissions testing, which currently focuses on the
predictive effectiveness of abilities that are presumed to develop
slowly over a significant period of time.
Future Directions
The study suggested several possible future directions. Because
of the substantial variation among fields, one possibility would
involve extending the survey to include additional fields of graduate
study. Some refinements could now be made on the basis of past
experience. For example, ratings of the frequency with which skills
are used, as well as the frequencies of errors and critical incidents,
could probably be omitted without much loss of information. OII the
other hand, it would seem desirable to add categories allowing ratings
of the differential importance of various reasoning skills at
different stages of graduate education, ranging from entry level to
dissertation writing.
Finally, based on the reasoning skills identified as most
important, criterion tasks might be developed against which the
validity of the current GRE analytical measure could be gauged. This
strategy would make especially good sense for those important skills
that may not be measurable in an operational test like the GRE General
Test, but which might correlate highly with the abilities now measured
by the test. One specific possibility would be the development of
rating forms, which could be used by faculty to rate the analytical
abilities of their students. These ratings could then be used as a
criterion against which GRE analytical scores could be judged.

Implications of Analytic Results


In providing some information on faculty perceptions of the
involvement of various reasoning skills in their disciplines, the
study has, we hope, implications for developing future versions of the
GRE analytical ability measure. Converting this information to
operational test items will represent a significant step, however, and
it is not crystal clear at this stage exactly how helpful these
results may be eventually. Nonetheless, the findings do seem to
contain several useful bits of information:
1. Among the specific reasoning skills perceived as the most
important were several, e.g., "deducing new information from
a set of relationships" and "understanding, evaluating, and
analyzing arguments," that seem well represented in the two
item types (analytical reasoning and logical reasoning)
currently included in the analytical section of the General
Test. This suggests that these item types should continue to
play a role in future editions of the GRE General Test.
2. Some skills that are not measured by the current version of
the analytical measure were rated as very important.
"Reasoning or problem solving in situations in which all the
needed information is not known" was among the skills rated
as most important in each discipline, but currently
unmeasured, at least in any explicit manner, by the
analytical measure. In this regard, however, the previous
GRE-sponsored work of Ward, Carlson, and Woisetschlager
(1983) is noteworthy. These investigators studied
“ill-structured” problems, i . e. , problems that do not provide
all the information necessary to solve the problem, and noted
the resemblance of these problems to one variant of the
logical reasoning item type used in the analytical measure.
They concluded that there was no indication that “illstructured”
problems measure different aspects of analytical
ability than do “well-structured” problems, and therefore
that “ill-structured” problems could not be expected to
extend the range of cognitive skills already measured by the
GRE General Test. They did note, however, that the
“ill-structured” item type could be used to increase the
variety of items types in the test. The findings of the
current study suggest that the inclusion of this item type
would probably meet with faculty approval in most fields of
study.
3. With respect to their perceived importance, skills involving
the generation of hypotheses/alternatives/explanations tended
to cluster together, and the inability to generate hypotheses
independently was one of the incidents rated consistently as
having a substantial effect on faculty perceptions of
students’ analytical abilities.
A number of years ago the GRE Board sponsored a series
of studies (Frederiksen & Ward, 1978; Ward, Frederiksen, &
Carlson, 1978; Ward & Frederiksen, 1977; Frederiksen & Ward,
1975) that explored the development and validation of tests
of scientific thinking, including one especially promising
item type called “Formulating Hypotheses,” which required
examinees to generate hypotheses. Although the research
suggested that this item type complemented the GRE verbal and
quantitative measures in predicting success in graduate
school, the work was discontinued, largely because of
problems in scoring items that require examinees to
construct, not merely choose, a correct response. Carlson
and Ward (1986) have proposed to renew work on the
“Formulating Hypotheses” item type in light of recent
advances in evaluating questions that involve constructed
responses. The results of the faculty survey reported here
would appear to support this renewal.
4. Some of the highly important skills that are currently
well represented in the analytical measure are viewed as more
important for success in some disciplines than in others.
For example, “understanding, analyzing, and evaluating
arguments” was seen as more important in English than in
computer science. However, some skills seen as highly
important in some disciplines but not in others may not be as
well represented currently. For example, “breaking down
complex problems into simpler ones” was perceived as
extremely important in computer science and engineering but
not at all important in English. This would suggest,
perhaps, the need to balance the inclusion of items
reflecting particular skills, so that skills thought to be
important (or unimportant) in particular disciplines are
neither over- nor underrepresented.
The several dimensions that appear to underlie clusters of
reasoning skills may provide an appropriate way to extend the
current test specifications for the analytical measure,
especially if new item types are developed to represent some
of these dimensions.
The reasoning skills that were rated as very important, and
consistently so, across disciplines point to a potential
common core of skills that could be appropriately included in
an “all-purpose” measure like the GRE General Test. Other
skills judged to be very important in only a few disciplines
might best be considered for extending the measurement of
reasoning skills in the GRE Subject Tests. Faculty comments
about the difficulty in separating reasoning from subject
matter knowledge would seem to support this strategy.

Other Comments from Respondents


A number of general comments were made about the study--some
positive and some negative. The study was described alternately as
“very well done” and “interesting, ” but also, by one respondent, as a
“complete waste of time. ” Most of the comments were positive,
however, and many pertained more specifically to the kinds of
questions that were asked. The consensus seemed to be that the
questionnaire was not easy to complete. Moreover, faculty in the
several disciplines sometimes had different ideas as to what kinds of
questions would have been appropriate. For example, one English
faculty member noted the lack of questions on the use of language in
critical writing, and a computer science faculty member observed that
questions on abilities involved in formulating proofs, which are vital
to success in computer science, were only partially covered in the
questionnaire. An education faculty member noted that the survey did
a better job of assessing skills associated with hypothesis-testing
than with other research skills.
Along these same lines, a number of other respondents also
believed that the questions were more relevant to other disciplines
than to theirs. Several computer science professors, for example,
characterized the questions as oriented more toward argument than
problem solving, in which they had greater interest. An engineering
professor said that some of the questions were more pertinent to
educational research than to scientific or technical research, and one
English faculty found that questions seemed “geared to the hard
sciences. ” Finally, some noted ambiguities or redundancies, or
lamented that the questions were “too fine.” Even with these
difficulties, however, most of the comments about questions were
positive: “Items seem especially well chosen,” “questions are
appropriate, ” “questions were quite thorough,” “a good set of
questions, ” “topics covered are critical,” and “your lists are right
on target. ” The majority of comments, therefore, suggested that the
questionnaire was pitched at about the right level and included
appropriate kinds of reasoning skills.
-lOA
number of comments were made about the relationship between
subject matter and analytical skills, e.g., that successful problem
solving is predicated on having specific knowledge in a field. One
respondent believed that the questionnaire downplayed the importance
of “context effects” in favor of “strict reasoning ability,” and
another noted that the measurement of analytical abilities is quite
discipline specific. Another commented on the difficulty of measuring
analytical ability without regard to the amount of knowledge
available.
Several faculty commented on the development of analytical skills
in graduate school and on the differential importance of these skills
at various stages of graduate education. one respondent said, “I
rated entering behavior or behavior across the entire program
(courses, internships, dissertation). If I were to rate the
dissertation experience alone, the ratings would have been much
higher. ” Many noted that by the end of their programs, skills would
be expected to increase and various reasoning errors could be expected
to occur less frequently: “Entering students are more likely to make
these errors and graduates to make far fewer.” Another said, “In some
sense, the essence of graduate training is analytical skills.’ “These
are skills which students acquire. Flhen they enter they make most of
the mistakes you mentioned. If they can’t learn, they leave the
program. ” Another said, “I’m more concerned about the presence of
these behaviors after my course than before it. One simply does not
harshly judge a beginning student who makes an error, but one could be
very critical of a student about to finish a Ph.D. thesis....’

Factor Analytic Results


To condense the many questions into a more manageable form,
factor analyses were computed for each section of the questionnaire.
For the section on reasoning skills, only the importance ratings were
analyzed because they were so highly correlated with frequency
ratings. Because frequency ratings were slightly less correlated with
ratings of seriousness and criticality in the other two sections, they
too were analyzed for the questionnaire sections on reasoning errors
and critical incidents.
The reader should bear in mind that the factors resulting from
this analysis should not be construed as representing dimensions of
analytical ability, but rather only as reflecting the dimensions that
underlie faculty perceptions of analytical abilities. These
dimensions merely reflect the extent to which graduate faculty tended
to rate certain skills as about equally important (or equally
unimportant ) , not the degree to which these dimensions represent
“factors of the mind.” Thus, the results presented below are intended
to provide a parsimonious representation of faculty perceptions rather
than a basis for postulating distinct analytical abilities.
Reasoning skills. For the ratings of importance of reasoning
skills, the largest eigenvalues were 16.4, 3.9, 2.4, 1.6, and 1.1, and
the application of a scree test (Cattell, 1966) suggested the
appropriateness of a five-factor solution, which was then rotated
according to the varimax criterion (Kaiser, 1958). The five-factor
varimax rotation accounted for 80% of the common variance. The factor
loadings and communalities are given in Appendix B. Table 7
summarizes the variables that were most instrumental in defining each
factor.
Factor I, which accounted for about a third of the common
variance, was characterized by highest loadings, generally, from
skills involving arguments. Thus, Factor I seems to involve a kind of
critical thinking related to argumentation.
Factor II accounted for about 29% of the common variance, and was
defined primarily by variables related to the drawing of conclusions,
e.g. I generating valid explanations, supporting conclusions with
sufficient data, and drawing sound inferences from observations. The
conclusion-oriented skills that define this second critical thinking
factor would seem to be of a more active or productive nature,
involving the construction of inferences or conclusions, rather than
evaluating the soundness of arguments or inferences, as is the case
for Factor I.
Factors III-V each accounted for a somewhat smaller proportion of
common variance (10% - 15%) than did Factors I and II. Factor III is
best defined by skills related to defining and setting up problems or
analyzing their components as a prelude to solving them. Factor IV is
best characterized by inductive reasoning skills, i.e., the drawing of
conclusions that have some evidential support, but not enough to
indicate logical necessity. Factor V is somewhat difficult to define,
but, by virtue of its two highest loadings, it seems to reflect an
ability to generate alternatives.

Reasoning errors. For the ratings of seriousness of reasoning
errors, the largest eigenvalues were 6.5 and 1.1, and the two factors
accounted for 96% of the common variance. (Frequency ratings were
also factor analyzed and are presented in Appendix B. Because the
results were so similar to the analysis of seriousness ratings, they
are not discussed here.) As shown in Table 8, Factor I, which
explained about 52% of the common variance, was characterized by
loadings from errors involved in the evaluation of evidence, e.g.,
offering irrelevant evidence to support a point. Factor II, on the
other hand, seemed to involve more formal logical errors, particularly
as related to reasoning with more statistically oriented material--for
example, failing to take account of a base rate, failing to recognize
differences between populations and samples, and confusing correlation
with causation.

Item-level Results


Tables 1-3 show the mean ratings by discipline for each question
included in the survey instrument. The numbers in the total column
are the grand means for all disciplines. Numbers under each
discipline represent for each item the deviations from these means.
The F tests in the right-most column indicate whether the means are
significantly different among the six disciplines. Because the
average ratings, over all respondents, for “frequency of use” and
“importance for success” correlated .99, only the importance ratings
are presented for reasoning skills. Likewise, only the “seriousness”
ratings are presented for reasoning errors, since their correlation
with frequency ratings was .98, and, for critical incidents, only the
average “effect” ratings are presented, since their correlation with
frequency ratings was .94.
Tables 1-3 show a substantial number of significant differences
among disciplines with respect to the importance placed on various
reasoning skills (Table l), the seriousness with which they regard
particular kinds of reasoning errors (Table 2), and the impact that
various critical incidents have on the estimation of students’
analytical abilities (Table 3). Table 4, showing only the very
highest rated skills and most critical errors and incidents, gives a
flavor of the differences among these six disciplines. For example,
chemistry faculty placed a high premium on being able to generate
hypotheses, questions, or experiments, to draw sound inferences from
observations, and to analyze and evaluate previous research. Engl i sh
faculty, on the other hand, saw greater importance in skills involving
argumentation-- being able to understand, evaluate, analyze, elaborate,
recognize, and support aspects of an argument.
Faculty in the six disciplines also appeared to have quite
different views as to the numbers of skills that were important in
their respective disciplines. The numbers of reasoning skills that
received average ratings of 4.0 or higher varied markedly by
discipline as follows: 23 for chemistry, 5 for computer science, 27
for education, 22 for engineering, 29 for English, and 26 for
psychology. These differences may have arisen, for example, from our
particular choice of questions, from differences in standards amonq
disciplines, or from some other factor(s) .
It can be seen, even from Table 4, however, that some skills were
-6-
viewed as very important by several disciplines. For example,
‘breaking down complex problems into simpler ones” was rated as the
single most important skill (of the 56 skills listed) in both computer
science and engineering. “Determining whether conclusions are
logically consistent with, and adequately supported by, the data” was
rated as one of the three most important skills by both education and
psychology faculty; “drawing sound inferences from observations” was
the highest rated skill in chemistry and nearly the highest in
education.
The extent to which faculty in different disciplines agreed on
the importance of various skills, errors, or incidents can be examined
in a slightly different manner. To get some idea of the skills,
errors, and incidents that were viewed as relatively important, and
for which average ratings did not differ significantly across
disciplines, Table 5 was prepared. This table shows only those skills
that received average ratings of importance of more than 3.5 over all
six disciplines combined, and for which analyses of variance did not
detect any significant differences among disciplines.
“Reasoning or problem solving in situations in which all the
needed information is not known” was the skill rated as most important
overall. Such skills as ‘detecting fallacies and logical
contradictions in arguments,” “deducing new information from a set of
relationships, ” and “recognizing structural similarities between one
type of problem or theory and another” were the next most highly rated
skills. These were followed closely by “taking well-known principles
and ideas from one area and applying them to a different specialty,’
“monitoring one’s own progress in solving problems,” and “deriving
from the study of single cases structural features or functional
principles that can be applied to other cases.”
Table 6 lists the reasoning errors and critical incidents that
were judged overall to be the most serious or to have the most effect
on the estimation of students’ abilities. Three errors/incidents were
judged to be most serious or critical: ‘accepting the central
assumptions in an argument without questioning them,” “being unable to
integrate and synthesize ideas from various sources,” and “being
unable to generate hypotheses independently.”
It should be noted that there are many other decision rules,
based on average ratings and differences among disciplines, that could
have been used here to form a “common core” of skills or errors/
incidents. Tables l-3 could be consulted to apply alternative rules.